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DIALOGUE
Emerging Statutory and Constitutional Tools for States
to Resist Federal Environmental Regulation

T

by Michael B. Gerrard

his is a time of high tensions between the federal gov
ernment and the states over environmental regula
tion. 1 The flashpoints include actions by the U.S. Environ
mental Protection Agency (EPA) against states that enact
laws shielding environmental audit reports from discov
ery; 2 the withdrawal of several states from certain regula
tory reform programs and delegated programs; 3 and EPA
accusations that some states are ignoring many violations
of the pollution control laws, 4 and loud denials by state
representatives. 5
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the
complex of federal environmental statutes enacted in the
1970s and 1980s still give Washington the upper hand in
most of these battles. However, several new tools are now
emerging that enable the states-and, in some instances,
municipalities and the private sector-to resist federal envi
ronmental directives and actions.
Some of the new tools are provided by Congress, and
some are provided by judges in their interpretations of the
Constitution. This Dialogue is devoted to a discussion of
these new tools.
Michael B. Gerrard is a partner in the New York office of Arnold & Porter,
a member of the adjunct faculties of Columbia Law School and the Yale
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, chair of the Executive
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and
former chair of the Environmental Law Section of the New York State Bar
Association. He is general editor of the six-volume Environmental Law
Practice Guide (Matthew Bender). Portions of this Dialogue previously
appeared in the New York Law Journal and are reprinted with permission.

1. The history of such tensions is discussed in Robert V. Percival, Envi

ronmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Mod
els, 54 Mo. L. REV. 1141 (1995).

2. See, e.g., Environmental Audits: EPA Action on Michigan Air Pro

gram Adds to Tension Over State Audit Laws, Daily Env't Rep.

(BNA), Jan. 10, 1997, at AA-1 (EPA has refused to give Idaho,
Michigan, and Texas full authority to implement Clean Air Act Title
V permitting programs because of their environmental audit laws
and is reviewing the audit laws of Colorado, Kansas, and Oregon);
Timothy A. Wilkins & Cynthia A.M. Stroman, Delegation Black

mail: EPA's Use of Program Delegation to Combat State Audit
Privilege Statutes, 34 CHEM. WASTE Lmo. REP. 893.

3. Regulatory Reform: Michigan Withdraws From CS/ Project, Citing
Concerns With Negotiating Process, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), July

3, 1996, at AA-1.

4. John H. Cushman Jr., States Neglecting Pollution Rules, White
House Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, at A l .
5 . State Officials Rip Browner for Undermining 'Partnership,' INSIDE
EPA WKLY. REP., Jan. 3, 1997, at 1.

Unfunded Mandates
Perhaps the most important new tool is the Unfunded Man
dates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA). 6 It is one of the few ele
ments of the House Republicans' "Contract With America"
to be enacted into law. It concerns "federal intergovernmen
tal mandates," defined as enforceable duties imposed on
state, local, or tribal governments by a federal statute or
regulation for which funds are not provided to carry out the
duties, and "federal private sector mandates," which are en
forceable duties imposed on nongovernmental persons and
entities. 7
At the regulatory level, UMRA does not bar unfunded
mandates. However, it requires them to jump through ad
ditional procedural hoops before they can take effect.
Federal agencies must publish analyses of the anticipated
costs and benefits of proposed regulations that may cost
the private sector or state, local, or tribal governments
more than $100 million a year. Federal agencies must se
lect "the least costly, most cost-effective or least burden
some alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule,"
or explain in writing why they have not. 8 Failure to pro
vide the necessary analysis can be challenged in court,
though the contents of the analysis and the agencies' sub
stantive decisions cannot. 9
At the legislative level, UMRA is even more prescriptive.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is required to ana
lyze legislative proposals and report to Congress whether
they will impose total annual costs of $50 million on lower
levels of government, or $100 million on the private sector.
The House and the Senate then cannot consider those bills
that, according to the CBO analysis, would impose federal
intergovernmental mandates of at least $50 million per year,
unless federal funding is provided to cover these costs. 10
UMRA primarily applies to future regulatory and legisla
tive enactments, but the statute also requires the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) to ex
amine unfunded mandates in existing law. 11 In response, on
6. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§658, 658a658g, 1501-71).
7. 2 u.s.c. §658.
8. Id. §1535.
9. Id. §1571.
10. Id. §658d.
11. Id. §§1551-1556.
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July 6, 1995, the ACIR listed 36 environmental programs
that it found to be "of significant concern" due to unfunded
mandates. Among them were Clean Air Act (CAA) requirements that states revise their permit programs, the state inventory of underground storage tanks, local government
water system standards under the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), and expanded state and local emergency response
planning under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act. 12
On January 24, 1996, the ACIR went further and recommended amendments to several federal statutes. These included Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) provisions concerning state development of control methods and
timetables for implementing federal clean water standards,
testing standards and other requirements under the SDWA,
the CAA's state implementation plan process, and the listing
of species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 13
UMRA is too new to have led to many reported judicial
decisions in the environmental arena. 14 However, it has
been injected into several ongoing policy debates. For example, in December 1996, two groups representing state
pesticide regulators filed comments asserting that aspects of
a proposed EPA rule concerning state management plans for
groundwater-threatening pesticides violated UMRA.
Small Business Act
Another new statute is the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA). 5 Its many provisions enhance the ability of small businesses to participate
in the rulemaking process. Most of them are specifically
aimed at small businesses, but it is not difficult to imagine
allegiances of such businesses with state and local governments. Two items deserve particular mention here.
First, the SBREFA amended the Equal Access to Justice
Act by allowing attorneys fees and costs to be awarded to
small businesses that were the subject of a civil action or administrative adjudication brought by a federal agency if "the
demand by the United States is substantially in excess of the
judgment finally obtained by the United States and is unreasonable when compared with such judgment.., unless the
party has committed a willful violation of law or otherwise
acted in bad faith." 6 This provision is not limited to small
businesses. For example, it may discourage EPA from denanding extremely high penalties from municipalities that
12. Criteriaon Identifying Unfunded Mandates Set by Advisory Commission to Guide Review, [26 Current Developments] Env't Rep.
(BNA) 530 (July 7, 1995).
13. Report on FederalMandatesRecommends Changesin Laws on Water, Air, Species, [26 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA)

1869 (Feb. 2, 1996).
14. But see Nevada v. Department of Energy, No. 96-70774 (9th Cir.

Jan. 13, 1998) (rejecting Nevada's claim that the U.S. Department of
Energy violated UMRA by not giving it funds to review site studies
at a proposed radioactive waste disposal facility in Yucca Mountain;
the court found that Nevada had no federal obligation to review these
studies, and that Nevada nonetheless had received federal funds for

have violated their FWPCA permits, which renders them
theoretically liable for fines of $25,000 per day of violation,
though the fines ultimately imposed (or settled on) tend to
be far lower.
Second, the SBREFA adds teeth to the Regulatory Flexibility Act. New federal regulations must now be accompanied by an analysis of "the projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements" from the new rule,
"a description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize
the significant economic impact on small entities consistent
with the stated objectives of applicable statutes," and an explanation of why other alternatives were rejected. 17 Small
businesses are also given a right to challenge agencies' compliance with these requirements in federal court. "sAlthough
this requirement is primarily procedural rather than substantive, it is not difficult to envision it leading to extensive litigation against new regulations, similar to the voluminous
litigation opposing proposed projects that resulted from the
National Environmental Policy Act.
Litigation has already been filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit challenging a new EPA land disposal rule under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) on the grounds, among others, that EPA violated the SBREFA. 1"Several lawsuits have been filed
charging that EPA violated the SBREFA by failing to convene small business review panels (another mechanism established by the new statute) before proposing revisions to
the national ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter. 20 And one court has found that the SBREFA
provides a basis for federal court jurisdiction over Regulatory Flexibility Act challenges to regulations adopted before the SBREFA's enactment, 2' but another court ruled to
the contrary. 22 The difference between these two courts
largely relates to differing interpretations of the legislative
history of the SBREFA. With respect to post-SBREFA
rules, one decision arising under the CAA found that the
SBREFA does not provide for judicial review of agency
compliance with certain rulemaking requirements. 23
Federal Facilities Compliance Act
A third statute increasing the states' power against the federal government is the Federal Facilities Compliance Act
(FFCA). 24 This law allows states that have been delegated
by EPA the authority to implement RCRA (as most have) to
institute enforcement actions against federal agencies and to
obtain civil penalties. The FFCA was enacted in the wake of
a U.S. Supreme Court decision that found that the U.S. government had not waived its sovereign immunity for such
suits; 25 the FFCA amounts to such a waiver.
17.
18.
19.
20.

this purpose); Dunn-Edwards Corp. v. EPA, No. 97-55561 (9th Cir.

21.

Aug. 27, 1997) (plaintiffs challenged EPA's proposed architectural
coatings rule under the CAA on the grounds that UMRA's rulemaking requirements were not followed; the complaint was dismissed,

22.

because under the CAA's judicial review provisions, which govern,
only final agency action may be reviewed).

23.

15. Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§201-253, 110 Stat. 857.
16. 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(l)(D), availablein ELR STAT. ADMIN. PROC.
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24.
25.

5 U.S.C. §604.
Id. §611.
FMC Corp. v. EPA, No. 96-1149 (D.C. Cir. filed May 8, 1996).
Suits Proliferate Over Small Business, Scientific Issues in New
Rules, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1010 (Sept. 26, 1997).
Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, No. 96-3364, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 19243 (3d Cir. July 28, 1997).
Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. 383,27 ELR
21023 (D. Me. 1997).
Dunn-Edwards Corp. v. EPA, No. 97-55561 (9th Cir. Aug. 27,
1997).
Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607,22 ELR 20804 (1992).
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The FFCA only applies to RCRA violations and not to
other environmental statutes. And judicial decisions have
affirmed the states' ability to enforce RCRA and its state
counterparts against federal facilities. 26
Though the FFCA explicitly increases the power of the
states, it was recently invoked successfully by a private
company that owned property in Rhode Island. Before the
company purchased the property, the U.S. Air Force used
the site for petroleum storage and distribution. The court
found that the FFCA clearly provided that the company
could sue the United States for the cost of cleaning up the
contamination allegedly left behind by the Air Force. 27
Commerce Clause
As described above, Congress has strengthened the states'
hand in dealing with federal agencies on environmental
matters. So has the Supreme Court.
The scope of federal power under the U.S. Commerce
Clause is one such battleground. In 1995, to the surprise of
most constitutional scholars, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Lopez 2 invalidated portions of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 on the grounds that the activities
regulated by the Act (possessing handguns near schools) did
not substantially affect interstate commerce. And in 1996, a
U.S. district court shockingly found that, under Lopez, applying the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to the cleanup of
groundwater contamination that does not travel across state
lines violates the Commerce Clause. This decision, United
States v. Olin Corp.,29 was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 3
Relying on Lopez, the Fourth Circuit handed a Christmas
present on December 23, 1997, to James J. Wilson, a land
developer who had been convicted of a felony violation under the FWPCA and sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment
for knowingly discharging fill material and excavated dirt
into wetlands without a permit. The trial court had instructed
the jury that the wetlands fell within federal jurisdiction
based on a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' regulation that
defined "waters of the United States" to include intrastate
wetlands, "the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce." 3 The Fourth
Circuit found that this regulation exceeded Congress' commerce power, as interpreted in Lopez, and, therefore, was
invalid. As a result, Mr. Wilson was awarded a new trial.32
Lopez may have effects on other environmental rules.
One that is the subject of particular attention in light of
Lopez is the Migratory Bird Rule. This rule sets out the
26. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 23 ELR 20800 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1692 (1994).
27. Charter Int'l Oil Co. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 104 (D.R.I.
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Corps' position that federal jurisdiction over wetlands extends to those "[that] are or would be used as habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird Treaties or waters [that] are or
would be used as habitat by other migratory birds [that]
cross state lines." 3 3 Before Lopez, some doubted the viability of this rule due to concerns over the manner in which it
was promulgated. " But today, some commentators suggest
that Lopez compels the invalidation of the Migratory Bird
Rule, 3' and the Wilson decision strengthens this view.
An effort to strike certain restrictions under the ESA on
Lopez grounds was rejected by a divided D.C. Circuit in late
1997. The issue was whether the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service could restrict certain building projects to protect the
endangered Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, where the
projects and the fly's habitat are exclusively located within
the state of California. Judge Patricia M. Wald found that
the ESA restriction "prevents the destruction of biodiversity
and thereby protects the current and future interstate commerce that relies on it." Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson,
concurring, disagreed with the biodiversity argument but
found that the ESA should be upheld as applied in this case,
because the "protection of the flies regulates and substantially affects commercial development activity which is
plainly interstate." Judge David B. Sentelle, dissenting, argued that Congress cannot, under the Commerce Clause,
"regulate the killing of flies, which is not commerce, in
southern California, which is not interstate." 36 This sharply
divided outcome, when combined with the Wilson decision,
may encourage further attempts to strike down certain government actions under Lopez.
As part of the cascade of important decisions issued in
June 1997, the Supreme Court announced another limitation on the federal government's power over the states. City
of Bourne v. Flores 3"involved a lawsuit by the Catholic
Archbishop of San Antonio against a Texas city that denied
a building permit for the expansion of a historic church. The
Archbishop claimed that the permit's denial violated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), a federal statute that prohibits all governmental actors (including
states) from imposing certain burdens on the free exercise of
religion. The Supreme Court found that Congress exceeded
its power under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting
RFRA. The statute was a considerable congressional intrusion into the states' traditional prerogatives, and it was enacted in the absence of a record providing instances of generally applicable laws that were passed because of religious
bigotry in the previous 40 years. Local laws-like the city of
Bourne's building code-were created under the general
authority to regulate for the health and welfare of the people
and imposed merely incidental burdens on religion. Thus,
RFRA lacked the necessary congruence and proportionality

29. 927 F. Supp. 1502, 26 ELR 21303 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
30. 107 F.3d 1506, 27 ELR 20778 (1lth Cir. 1997).

33. 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
34. Tabb Lakes Ltd. v. United States, 885 F.2d 866, 20 ELR 20008 (4th
Cir. 1989), affg 715 F. Supp. 726, 19 ELR 20672 (E.D. Va. 1988).
But see Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 25 ELR 21046
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Cargill, Inc. v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 407, 26 ELR 20001 (1995).

31. 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(3) (1993) (emphasis added).

35. Michael Bablo, Leslie Salt Co. v. United States: Does the Recent Su-

1996).
28. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

32. United States v. Wilson, No. 96-4498 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997). The
same court had earlier rejected an argument that Lopez eliminates

FWPCA jurisdiction over discharges into sewers that feed wastewater treatment plants that empty into rivers flowing into the ocean.

United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343 [28 ELR 20153] (4th Cir.

1997).

preme Court Decisionin UnitedStates v. Lopez Dictate the Abrogation of the 'MigratoryBird Rule'? 14 TEMP. ErCwL. L. &TECH. J.

277 (1995).

36. National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, No. 96-5354 (D.C. Cir.

Dec. 5, 1997).
37. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted. The decision construed Congress' lawmak
ing power under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than un
der the Commerce Clause (the constitutional basis for most
environmental statutes), but it (like the other cases dis
cussed below) demonstrates the Court's hostility toward un
necessary intrusions into state power.
Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment is a limitation on congressional
power that had long been mostly dormant. However, in
1992, the Supreme Court decided New York v. United
States, 38 a challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Amendments Act (LLRWAA) by New York State and two of
its counties. The Court struck down a portion of the LLRWAA
that required states to take title to radioactive waste generated
within their borders if they failed to make adequate disposal ar
rangements. The Court held that Congress violated the Tenth
Amendment by directly compelling the state to enact laws in
order to enforce a federal regulatory program.
In 1996, the Fifth Circuit relied on New York in striking
down the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988, which
required states to establish remedial action programs for
removing lead contaminants from school drinking water
systems. The court found that the Tenth Amendment pro
hibited Congress from imposing mandates that require
states to establish new programs or else face civil enforce
ment proceedings. 39
In June 1997, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and ex
tended New York. In Printz v. United States, 40 the Court
struck down a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act that required local law enforcement offi
cials to participate in the handgun purchaser screening pro
cess. The Court found that the mandate offended the Tenth
Amendment. Unlike the "take title" provision of the
LLRW AA, the Brady Act did not require states to adopt
legislative programs, but only to carry out a federal pro
gram. And it imposed its mandate on individual state offi
cials and not on the states themselves. In view of Printz's
5-4 majority, however, these distinctions made no differ
ence; Congress still trespassed on state authority in the
Brady Act. It did not matter that the Act would only impose
a relatively minor burden on local officials as part of a so
lution to a major national problem; in the view of the ma
jority, which was led by Justice Scalia, the weighing of
burdens and benefits is inappropriate when state sover
eignty is at stake.
Citing Printz and New York, the Second Circuit remarked
in dictum that the CERCLA provision that extends state
statutes of limitations for toxic tort actions 41 "appears to
purport to change state law, and is therefore of questionable
constitutionality." 42 However, because the parties had not
raised that issue, the court did not technically reach it.
38.

505 U.S. 144, 22 ELR 21082( l 992)(the author of this Dialogue rep
resented one of the counties in this case).

39. ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 26 ELR 21257 (5th Cir. 1996),
cen. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2532 (1997).
40. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
41. 42 U.S.C. §9658, ELR STAT. CERCLA §309.
42. ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360, 27
ELR 21335, 21339-40 n.5 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment provides, "[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citi
zens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 43 More than a cen
tury ago, the Supreme Court interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment to extend to suits by all persons (except the fed
eral government) against a state in federal court. 44 This pro
tection does not apply if a state has waived its immunity. 45 In
1989, the Court held in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 46
that Congress may in some circumstances abrogate state
sovereign immunity, and that it had done so in enacting
CERCLA.
But in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 41 the Court
reversed its decision in Union Gas and held that Congress
could not abrogate state sovereign immunity in statutes that
are based on the Commerce Clause. This was primarily be
cause the Commerce Clause was enacted before the Elev
enth Amendment and, therefore, could not preempt the
Eleventh Amendment and expand the federal court jurisdic
tion that the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to limit.
Seminole Tribe was decided under the Indian Gaming Regu
latory Act, but it led to a wave of motions by states seeking
dismissal from ongoing federal environmental litigation.
Most of these motions were denied, mainly because state of
ficials were also named as defendants. Under Ex Pane
Young, 48 the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit seeking
prospective relief against a state official acting in violation
of federal law. 49
In yet another June 1997 decision, the Supreme Court
limited the Ex Parte Young doctrine. In Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe ofIdaho, 50 it barred a tribe from suing in fed
eral court to establish its title to the submerged lands and bed
of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various tributaries lying within
the tribe's reservation. The tribe argued that Ex Pane Young
gave it the ability to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment
and remain in federal court, especially because it alleged an
ongoing violation of its property rights; the Court disagreed,
in view of the substantial state interests involved. This may
open the door to further erosion of Ex Pane Young's reach,
thereby strengthening the hand of states under the Eleventh
Amendment.
Several states have successfully relied on Seminole Tribe
in order to win dismissal of environmental claims charged
against them. One of the first was New York. William Bu
benicek, at that time a lieutenant with the Bureau of Envi43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89( 1984).
491 U.S. 1, 19 ELR 20974 (1989).
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dep't of
Transp., 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996); Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp.
963 (27 ELR 20254] (D. Mass. 1996); see also Mancuso v. New
York State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289 (26 ELR 21418] (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 481 (1996) (defendant does not enjoy Elev
enth Amendment immunity under the FWPCA because it is not fully
a state agency).
117 S. Ct. 2028, 27 ELR 21227 (1997).
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ronmental Conservation Investigation Unit of the New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC),
had persuaded the Prisco family to allow their land in Patterson, New York, to be used for dumping certain waste,
purportedly in connection with the DEC's law enforcement activities. Later, it was revealed that Bubepicek was
acting beyond his authority, and he was fired. The Priscos,
who were left with a contaminated site, sued the state, various state officials, and the entities that had dumped the
waste on their land.
Judge Carter of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York concluded that Seminole Tribe "overturned the basis on which private citizens had been permitted to sue states" under CERCLA, and that in the wake of
Seminole, "state sovereign immunity cannot be abrogated
absent Congressional legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment or a waiver by the state." Because neither of
these was present here, he dismissed the suit against the state
and its officials. 51 Ex ParteYoung was not addressed in the
decision.
Also relying on Seminole Tribe, the state of Indiana won
dismissal from a CERCLA contribution action involving a
landfill for which it was a potentially responsible party, 52
and the state of Michigan won dismissal from a RCRA citizens suit concerning a contaminated site that it owned. " The
Eleventh Amendment has also been held to bar suits in fed51. Prisco v. New York, No. 91 CIV 3990, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14944, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1996).
52. Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 962 F. Supp.
131, 27 ELR 21307 (N.D. Ind. 1997); see also Thomas v. FAG
Bearings Corp., 50 F.3d 502, 26 ELR 20207 (8th Cir. 1995) (involving the involuntary joinder of the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources).
53. Rowlands v. Pointe Mouillee Shooting Club, 959 F. Supp. 422, 27
ELR 21167 (E.D. Mich. 1997).

eral court against state officials over highway projects54 and
stream erosion control projects. s
Conclusion
All these new statutory and constitutional tools are too
young for their possibilities and limitations to be fully understood. However, counsel representing states-and, for
some of the tools, municipalities and private parties-should keep them in mind when litigating environmental cases against the federal government.
None of the new tools has had a great impact on the behavior of either the federal government or the state governments in the environmental sphere. (An exception is the
FFCA, which has overt operational consequences.) UMRA
and the SBREFA were enacted in response to congressional
concerns about overreaching by the federal bureaucracy
(and, to a certain extent, by Congress itself), but aside from
generating certain paperwork requirements, they do not
seem to have changed the culture of any of the institutions
involved.
The Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh
Amendment decisions likewise have had little impact on
administrative or legislative behavior. Their principal
significance is that they provide important tools that
litigants might be able to use when confronted with difficult
situations. No attorney challenges the constitutionality of a
statute or regulation with great confidence of victory, but
there have been enough successes under these new
doctrines to make the effort worthwhile where the situation
is appropriate and the stakes are high enough
54. Zarrilli v. Weld, 875 F. Supp. 68, 25 ELR 20945 (D. Mass. 1995).
55. Southfork of the Eel River Envtl. League v. Corps of Eng'rs, No. C96-3983,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9260 (N.D. Cal. June 17,1997).

In Memoriam
ELR-The Environmental Law Reporter regrets to announce the
passing of Bruce Latta. Subscribers will know Bruce from the
energy and devotion he brought to his responsibilities in the ELR
Customer Service Department. All those who knew Bruce will
miss his warmth and generous spirit. To those who did not know
him, we can only say that you missed knowing someone very

special.
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